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I.

INTRODUCTION
Pacific Bay Baking Company ("Pacific Bay") respectfully

submits its reply brief on appeal.
II.

ARGUMENT
A.

G&K Services has Briefed the Wrong Appeal.

In its opening brief, Pacific Bay argued that attorney's
fees should be allocated on a claim by claim basis.

Thus,

Pacific Bay is entitled to fees attributable to its successful
defense of G&K Service's claim for liquidated damages, regardless
of whether G&K is entitled to fees attributable to the stipulated
judgment in this matter.
Rather than the one at bar, G&K has briefed a case in which
only one claim is at issue and thus where there can be only one
party entitled to fees.1

By changing the facts (from a multiple

to single claim case) as well as the issue on appeal, G&K is thus
able to cite authority for the proposition that a plaintiff who
obtains some but not all of the relief sought is normally
entitled to fees.2

G&K spends it entire brief attacking what Pacific Bay
clearly labeled an alternative argument: if the Court disagrees
that fees should be allocated claim by claim, Pacific Bay was
nonetheless the prevailing party under the circumstances.
Opening Brief, pp. 14, 24. Cf. Response Brief, pp. 27, 34.
2

See First Southwestern Financial Services v. Sessions, 875
P.2d 553 (Utah 1994) (single claim for deficiency action);
Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981)
(affirmative judgment rule on single claim); Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London v. North American Van Lines, 829 P.2d 978 (Okl.
1992) (defendant succeeded in lowering damages paid, but did not
defeat claim entirely). But see Smith v. Jenkins, 873 P.2d 1044
(Okla. 1994) (rejecting net judgment rule in comparative
negligence action).
1

Pacific Bay does not quibble with G&K's rule as applied to
most single claim cases. Opening Brief, p. 21. This is not a
single claim case.
B.

G&K's Misunderstanding of the Issues on Appeal
Permeates its Argument on the Standard of Review.

While it correctly notes that Pacific Bay "does not
challenge the language of the contract," G&K incorrectly
concludes that the abuse of discretion standard must therefore
apply.

The language is what it is. The issue is not what the

words are, but how they are affected by the facts and law.
While G&K makes the inevitable claim in a footnote that the
trial court erred in finding that G&K breached the contract, it
did not feel strongly enough about this issue to cross-appeal.
The facts are thus undisputed, leaving this Court with an issue
of law: did the trial court err in denying Pacific Bay fees
attributable to its success on a discrete claim at trial?
G&K's argument for an "abuse of discretion" standard ducks
the question.

The issue of "discretion" comes up when the amount

of fees are at issue.

Opening Brief, p. 5 n. 1.

This is not

such a case, except to the extent the trial court failed to make
adequate findings in support of its fee award to G&K.3
Concerning the standard of review, the only case which G&K
cites and Pacific Bay did not is Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1993). Baldwin did not involve a contract, but instead
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1), which permits the court to award
fees in the event a claim or defense is 1) meritless and 2) was
asserted in bad faith. The Baldwin court first addressed whether
fees were appropriate under the statute, and then turned to what
it termed the "discretion" issue: the amount of the award. Id.
at 1199. See also Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet,
P.2d
, 240
Utah Adv. Rpt. 17, 21 (Utah App. 1994) (mechanics lien statute
obligated court to award fees to defendant who successfully
(continued...)
2

The question at bar is one of law.
C.

Review is de novo.

Pacific Bay is Entitled to Fees for its Success at
Trial Regardless of whether it Counterclaimed.

G&K argues that only defendants who prevail on counterclaims
are entitled to fees.

Instead, Utah law permits a party who

successfully defends against a claim to "recover the fees
attributable to those claims on which the party was successful."
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217, 221
(Utah App. 1990).

See also Stacev Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d

1080 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied. 779 P.2d 688 (1989)
(defendant was entitled to fees for claims on which it was
successful, including not only counterclaims but successful
defense of attempt to accelerate promissory note).

Cf. Dixie

State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 n. 9 (Utah 1988) ("Trial
courts are accustomed to apportioning attorney fees between
multiple parties and attributing fees to separate causes of
action."); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. supra. n. 3,

P.2d

, 240 Utah Adv. Rpt. 17, 20-21 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court
erred under mechanics lien statute in not awarding defendants
fees attributable to successful motion for summary judgment
dismissing mechanic's lien action).

3

(...continued)
sought summary judgment dismissing a mechanics lien action, while
bond statute allowed court discretion).
For its discretion standard, Baldwin cites Dixie State Bank
v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), in turn citing Turtle
Management v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). Both
of these cases centered on the amount of fees awarded. Dixie
State Bank. 764 P.2d at 989 and n. 6; Turtle Management. 645 P.2d
at 671.
3

G&K distinguishes this authority only by artifice.

G&K

gives Occidental/Nebraska barely a nod, Response Brief, p. 19,
and incorrectly claims that the defendant in Stacev Properties
received fees only because it won on a few counterclaims.
Response Brief, p. 33.
Similarly, G&K dismisses Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d 605 (Wash.
App. 1993), recon. denied. 1993 Wash. App. Lexis 390 (1993) in a
footnote, arguing that Marassi dealt with (and implicitly, only
with) fees for a successful counterclaim.
n. 8.

Response Brief, p. 28,

Marassi is instead directed squarely to the issue at bar,

and teaches that the net judgment rule fails when "a defendant
has not made a counterclaim for affirmative relief, but merely
defends against the plaintiff's claims."

859 P.2d at 607.4

While it at least cites Occidental. Stacev, and Marassi
(although it inaccurately recounts the latter two), G&K is simply
mum on the Florida cases which Pacific Bay discussed in its
opening brief.

See Folta v. Bolton. 493 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1986);

Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Assocs., Inc..
619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993); Park Lane Condominium Ass'n v.
DePadua, 558 So.2d 85 (Fla. App. 1990).

These cases are fully

consistent with Utah law: attorney's fees should be awarded on a
claim by claim basis, regardless of whether the defendant

Thus, "when the alleged contract breaches at issue consist
of several distinct and severable claims, a proportionality
approach is more appropriate." Id. at 608.
Marassi carefully noted that its plaintiff raised multiple
and distinct breaches of contract, not one breach with several
alternative damage theories. Id. The same is true here.
4

prevails on a counterclaim or instead simply defeats one of the
plaintiff's claims.5
This law is also good policy.

Under G&K's "counterclaim"

rule, a defendant who resists counterclaiming and then defeats
all but one insignificant claim in a multi-claim case is entitled
to no fees, while the plaintiff remains entitled to fees (at
least to the extent she succeeded).

This result penalizes the

nonlitigious defendant, while at the same time letting a
plaintiff whose claims were all groundless, save one, escape
without compensating the defendant for its time.
The claim-by-claim analysis also recognizes that under the
rules of joinder, what otherwise would be distinct lawsuits under
a contract (such as the case here) may be tried together as
separate claims in one action.

Liberal joinder serves the

salutary purposes of judicial economy.

However, a defendant's

right to fees for defeating what otherwise would be a wholly
separate suit should not be curtailed simply because the
plaintiff has chosen to bring her claims all at once.

See Folta

v. Bolton, 493 So. 2d at 443 (discussing plaintiffs' tactics in
joining nonmeritorious claims with meritorious claims in order to
jockey for fees).

Cf. Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1322

(Utah 1987) (defendant could not use unresolved status of

5

G&K cites In re Marriage of Watters, 782 P.2d 1220 (Colo.
App. 1989), a single claim suit, for the notion that a party only
has to win on a "significant" issue, and receive some of the
benefit sought in the litigation, in order to prevail. Response
Brief, p. 30. The instant case is not about issues; it is about
wholly distinct claims which would have been separate lawsuits
absent rules governing joinder. Regardless of what is done in
Colorado, Utah law divides cases by claims.
5

permissive counterclaim to thwart plaintiff's right to fees under
separate claim on which plaintiff had already prevailed);6 Turtle
Management v. Haggis Management, supra, n. 3, 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982) (although plaintiff had used Rule 18 to join all
possible claims against all defendants, plaintiff was only
entitled to fees from the lone defendant against whom it
prevailed; plaintiff could not seek a "free ride" for its fees at
the expense of the successful defendants).7
D.

G&K's Offer of Judgment Argument Bears, at Most, Only
on the Issue of Whether Pacific Bay was Recruired to Pay
G&K's Fees, not on whether G&K Should Pay Pacific Bay's
Fees.

G&K apparently urges either: 1) that Pacific Bay could have
cut off liability for fees to G&K by making an offer of judgment;
2) that an offer of judgment would have entitled Pacific Bay to
fees; or 3) both.
If G&K means to argue point one, it has again misunderstood
this appeal.

This case is not about Pacific Bay's liability for

The Triax dissent (unsuccessfully) argued that the net
judgment rule ought to control the fee issue, and that the rule
could not be applied until all counterclaims were resolved. 74 0
P.2d at 1323-24. The dissent noted, again to no avail, that the
parties' contract gave the prevailing party dn the "suit" the
right to fees, and argued that "suit" included counterclaims.
Id., 740 P.2d at 1324.
The fee clause in the case at bar requires the "unsuccessful
party" in a "legal proceeding" to pay the fees of the successful
party. G&K was the unsuccessful party on its wholly discrete
claim for liquidated damages.
7

Florida statutory law requires the courts in multiple-party
cases to apportion fees among prevailing parties "in accordance
with the principles of equity." Folta v. Bolton. 493 So. 2d at
443. The Folta court found that multiple party actions (such as
the kind at issue in Turtle Management) are sufficiently
analogous to multiple claim actions to warrant application of the
same rule to the latter. Id.
6

G&K's fees properly attributable to the open account claim.

It

is about G&K's liability for fees to Pacific Bay on the
liquidated damages claim.
Utah R.Civ.P. 68, governing offers of judgment, is itself
directed to discrete "claimts]," not lawsuits.8

First

Southwestern Financial Services v. Sessions. supra, n. 1, 875
P.2d 553 (Utah 1994), a case decided after Pacific Bay filed its
opening brief, was a single claim case.

This one is not.

Thus,

First Southwestern's teaching (that a defendant can cut off its
obligation to pay fees on a claim by offering judgment) does not
apply.

By crossing lines between the two claims at issue, G&K

misapplies the rule, as did the trial court.9
G&K further errs if it believes that Pacific Bay could have
saved its right to fees on the liquidated damages claim only by
offering judgment on the open account claim.
the claims to be treated separately.

Rule 68 requires

Moreover, the offer of

judgment rule does not apply in the case of a total defense
victory on a claim.

See 7 J. Moore, J. Lucas & K. Sinclair, Jr.,

Mooref s Federal Practice % 68.06[2] (2d ed. 1994) (discussing

8

See also Kehoe v. Keister, 727 F. Supp. 896, 899-90 (D. N.J.
1989) (discussing Rule 68 in context of multiple claim case).
Cf. Shores v. Sklar. 885 F.2d 760, 762-63 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S. Ct. 843, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990)
(because defendant successfully offered judgment for entire
putative class action, not simply on his individual claims,
defendant lost right to appeal district court's denial of class
certification).
9

First Southwestern could easily have disavowed Occidental
Nebraska or Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992),
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), but did not. The court
further emphasized that it believed its hand was forced by Utah's
deficiency statute. 23 9 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7-8.
7

Delta Air Lines. Inc. v. August. 450 U.S. 346, 101 S. Ct. 1146,
67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981)).

Pacific Bay did not believe that G&K was

entitled to any liquidated damages.

Pacific Bay was not

obligated to make a meaningless offer of zero on that claim in
order to preserve its right to fees attributable to its success
on the claim.
G&K also deems Pacific Bay a deadbeat who would not even pay
what it agreed that it owed.

This needless claim is belied by

G&K's own citation to the record, which shows that Pacific Bay
had agreed in settlement discussions that it owed G&K a sum
certain.

Response Brief, p. 21. However, Pacific Bay refused to

pay G&K any liquidated damages.

Once in the courtroom and able

to put on its defense against liquidated damages, Pacific Bay
stipulated to judgment in the agreed amount so that only the
disputed issue would be tried.
G&K's related complaint about the time and expense it spent
on the stipulated issues is more window dressing.
has paid G&K for its time.

Pacific Bay

Pacific Bay's complaint is that much

of G&K's fees were not attributable to a success.10
G&K also carps at length about Pacific Bay's "failure to
show" at the first trial in this matter, apparently in the belief
that this has something to do with the issue on appeal. As
explained in its successful moving papers to set aside the
default, Pacific Bay did not appear because it did not receive
notice of the trial. Record, pp. 29-30. Once it received a copy
of the proposed default judgment, Pacific Bay quickly retained
counsel, had the default set aside, and went on aggressively to
defend this case.
G&K did not suffer by virtue of the default being set aside,
since the trial court ordered Pacific Bay to pay G&K's fees for
trial preparation (including, presumably, preparation for its
failed liquidated damages claim) and even the fees for G&K's
(continued...)
8

E.

G&K Embraces the Fallacy of the Constructive Award.

G&K urges that if Pacific Bay is entitled to "recognition"
for G&K's failure at trial, it has been compensated "almost
twice" what it is due by virtue of the trial court's cut in G&K's
fees.

Response Brief, p. 36.

We have discussed in Pacific Bay's

opening brief why this argument is so wrongheaded.
G&K was not entitled under any circumstances to be paid for
its failure at trial.

The trial court did not compensate Pacific

Bay at all for its success at trial.
F.

This was error.

The Trial Court made only Assumptions, not Findings,
Concerning the Amount of Fees Awarded to G&K.

The record does in G&K's argument that the trial court made
adequate findings concerning the amount of G&K's fees.
G&K's lead counsel proffered testimony that he spent 8.5
hours before trial in this matter.
p. 318, Ins. 1-6.

Record, p. 317, Ins. 24-25;

Counsel took an additional 2.5 hours in

drafting and serving the complaint.

Record, p. 317, Ins. 19-20.

Counsel's associate spent six hours researching Pacific
Bay's course of performance defense on the liquidated damages
claim (on which Pacific Bay was completely successful), two hours
of trial preparation time, and time at trial.

Record, p. 318,

Ins. 12-19.
Adding in the plaintiff's trial time spent following the
proffer, and estimating the amount of additional time the
plaintiff would spend on drafting findings and conclusions, the

10

(. . .continued)
unsuccessful opposition to setting aside the default.
50.
9

Record, p.

trial court arrived at a total fee of $2,080, which it then
reduced to $1,450.00, in purported recognition of Pacific Bay's
success at trial.

Record, p. 403, Ins. 21-25; p. 404, Ins. 12.

Under Utah law, the $1,450.00 which the trial court awarded
must be attributable in toto to whatever success G&K obtained at
trial.

The trial court made no such finding or computation.

Moreover, the record proves that the bulk of G&K's time was
directed to the claim upon which G&K failed.

The time devoted to

this claim encompassed almost the entire trial, as well six hours
of research directed to the course of performance issue, and
presumably a commensurate amount of actual witness preparation
time on the issue.
When G&K defaulted Pacific Bay early in this case, G&K's
lead counsel submitted an affidavit of attorney's fees testifying
that he had spent 2.5 hours in preparation for trial and for
attending trial long enough to proffer evidence and identify
witnesses.

Record, p. 57, 1 3 (affidavit); p. 16-17 (Findings

and Conclusions setting forth G&K's proffer).

Yet at the real

trial, counsel claimed fees for 21.5 hours of his time and his
associate's, almost a tenfold increase.

This increase can of

course be explained: the case went to trial the second time
around.

However, G&K lost the contested claim at trial.

Although apparently prepared to handle the trial alone when
G&K defaulted Pacific Bay, G&K's lead counsel felt compelled to
involve an associate at the actual trial once Pacific Bay
submitted a trial brief.

Record, p. 318, Ins. 7-19.

This trial

brief, however, went solely to the claim upon which Pacific Bay

10

prevailed.

Record, p. 66.

Since lone counsel took only 2.5

hours to 1) prepare for the entire first trial (including,
presumably, preparation for the liquidated damages claim), and 2)
proffer evidence, it is unlikely that any more time than this was
required to prepare the second time around on the open account
claim, the only claim on which G&K saw success.
In footnote 12 of its brief, G&K offers some after the fact
arithmetic showing how the trial court might have arrived at its
award.

The trial court, not litigants, are required to make

findings.

The record shows that only a de minimis amount of

G&K's time can be fairly charged to a success.

The court's award

tracks neither the evidence nor law.
The remainder of G&K's argument on the findings question
confuses the main issue on appeal (the correctness of awarding
fees on a claim by claim basis) with the distinct issue of what
fees G&K was entitled to.

Nowhere does G&K point to the findings

which Utah law demands.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court's fee award should be reversed, with
instructions for the court to award each party those fees (and
only those fees) attributable to the claim on which the party
succeeded.
Is / CT day of August, 1994
DATED this
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae

Mark Wv Dykes
Counsel, for^ Pacific Bay
Baking Company
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